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I. INTRODUCTION
A. INAUGURATION
Consciously invoking the language of the U.S. Declaration of
Independence,1 Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in July 2019 announced the
creation of a Commission on Unalienable Rights to advise him on principles of
human rights to guide our foreign policy.2
Even if the Commission had been blessed with an open-ended mandate, the
task of advising on “unalienable” rights would have been daunting.
Conceptually, “unalienable” and “human” rights are the same.3 They are rights
inherent in all human beings. Governments can neither grant human rights nor
take them away (“alienate” them). Governments can only “recognize” human
rights.4
The vexing challenge is to determine which rights meet this exalted
standard. This is especially so because, over time, “the idea of human rights . . .
is capable of encompassing new understandings of what freedom and equality
require.”5
But Secretary Pompeo’s Commission did not have an open-ended mandate.
Its task was made even more difficult by its actual assignment: to ground its
review in “our nation’s founding principles and [the principles of] the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (UDHR).6
Our founding principles and the UDHR should be part of any review of the
role of human rights in our foreign policy. But the whole? What about the
expansive body of international human rights law and institutions developed and
accepted by most of the world since 1948?
In announcing the Commission, Secretary Pompeo had nothing positive to
say about these post-1948 developments. He decried the proliferation of claims
of rights. He lamented clashes between some rights. He posited confusion
among states and international institutions about their responsibilities
concerning rights. And he objected that international institutions for protection
of human rights “have drifted from their original mission.”7

1 “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SEC’Y OF STATE MICHAEL R. POMPEO REMARKS TO THE PRESS (2019),
https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-michael-r-pompeo-remarks-to-the-press-3/
[hereinafter
Pompeo Remarks].
3 The Commission rightly recognizes that “unalienable rights” were “sometimes referred to as natural
rights in the founding era” and “today are commonly called human rights.” U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT
OF THE COMM’N ON UNALIENABLE RTS. (2020) at 11, https://www.state.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/08/Report-of-the-Commission-on-Unalienable-Rights.pdf [hereinafter Report].
4 “The very notion of a human right is that of a right inherent in human beings and not dependent for its
existence on the enactment of any state or international institution. Positive law can establish and
clarify a state’s enforceable obligation to individuals and to other states. But positive law—whether
that of a nation-state or of the international legal order—does not create a human right, nor can its
silence or conduct nullify a human right.” Id. at 40-41.
5 Id. at 38.
6 Id. at 6; United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948 [hereinafter UDHR];
See also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CHARTER FOR THE COMM’N ON UNALIENABLE RTS. (2019),
https://www.state.gov/charter-for-the-commission-on-unalienable-rights/.
7 Pompeo Remarks, supra note 2.
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Granted, there is some truth—but hardly an indictment—in these points.
Claims of rights do proliferate; since 1948, many have been accepted by the
overwhelming majority of the world’s nations and have become part of
international law.8 Rights do sometimes clash and courts must resolve tensions
between them; consider, for example, the clash between fair trial and free press
embedded in the U.S. Constitution.9 Like any body of law, international human
rights law does not give clear answers to all questions; they must be interpreted.
And international human rights institutions at times stretch and arguably exceed
their mandates.10
But these partial truisms are not reasons to downplay all of modern
international human rights law since 1948 and to treat our domestic law and a
non-binding declaration of seven decades ago, as the overriding guides to human
rights in foreign policy. As a broad coalition of human rights groups and
advocates later commented, “[T]he validity of the human rights project is in no
way imperiled by the increasing number of rights claims made by those whose
rights have historically been denied them.”11
B. MEMBERS
Thus constrained by the restricted vision of its patron, the Commission was
chaired by Harvard Law Professor Mary Ann Glendon. I am privileged to call
Professor Glendon a friend and have long admired and learned from her
scholarship on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.12 She is perhaps
better known for declining to accept the University of Notre Dame’s Laetare
Medal in 2009 after learning that President Obama would be the main
commencement speaker and receive an honorary degree.13
Another Commission member was my former colleague, Notre Dame Law
Professor Paolo Carozza, Director of the Kellogg Institute for International
Studies. Professor Carozza was a stalwart defender of human rights as a member
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights from 2006 to 2010 and as
its President from 2008 to 2009. More recently, he was appointed by the State
Department (under Pompeo) to serve on the Venice Commission of the Council
of Europe.14

8 See Part II below.
9 E.g., Nebraska Press Ass’n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
10 Among other examples, see Judge Humberto Sierra Porto’s dissent from the majority’s holding that
economic, social and cultural rights are justiciable under Article 26 of the American Convention on
Human Rights. Lagos del Campo v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 12.795 (Aug. 31, 2017).
11 Letter to Mary Ann Glendon, Chairperson of the Comm’n on Unalienable Rts. (July 30, 2020),
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/CUR%20Report%20Comment%20NGO%20Lett
er%20Final%2020.07.30.pdf [hereinafter Letter].
12 E.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rts., 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1153 (1998); MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Random House, 1st ed. 2001).
13 Mary Ann Glendon Refuses to Accept Laetare Medal from Notre Dame, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY
(Apr.
27,
2009),
https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/mary_ann_glendon_refuses_to_accept_laetare_medal_fr
om_notre_dame.
14 Amanda Gray, Professor Paolo Carozza Appointed to Venice Commission, UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME
(Mar. 13, 2019), https://law.nd.edu/news-events/news/professor-paolo-carozza-appointed-to-venicecommission.
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Other members of Secretary Pompeo’s Commission consisted almost
exclusively of his staff and religious advocates. The Executive Secretary,
Rapporteur, and two of the ten original members were from his Policy Planning
Staff.15 Of the remaining eight members, six had backgrounds in religious or
religion-related institutions, and a seventh has published extensively on Roman
Catholic bioethics.16
C. REPORT AND REACTION
After a year of study and public consultations, the Commission released a
draft report in July 2020.17 Not unfairly characterizing the draft, Secretary
Pompeo exulted that it “emphasizes foremost among these rights are property
rights and religious liberty.”18 In his view, “[t]he vital 20th century human rights
project has come unmoored, and it needs a re-grounding.”19
A scant two weeks were allowed for public comment on the draft. The main
response was a letter to Glendon from more than 100 human rights, social
justice, and faith-based organizations, including groups such as Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch, and more than 100 individuals,
including twenty-five former senior government officials, mostly from posts in
the field of human rights. They charged that the Commission had been used to
advance Pompeo’s “personal political and religious beliefs” and his “political
agenda.”20 Criticizing the draft report on multiple grounds, they concluded that
it “undermines decades of human rights progress.” 21
In August, following what the Commission characterized as “only small
changes,” the Commission published its final Report.22 In some respects, the
Report is praiseworthy.23 Among other points noted below, the Commission
recommends that “it is urgent to champion human rights in foreign policy.”24

15

Commission on Unalienable Rights: Member Bios, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
https://www.state.gov/commission-on-unalienable-rights-member-bio.The
original
Executive
Secretary, Kiron Skinner, was later replaced by Peter Berkowitz. Professor Kenneth Anderson of
American University, not on the original list, joined the Commission later.
16 Id. Chairperson Glendon (U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom); Paolo Carroza
(Notre Dame); Hamza Yusuf Hanson (President of Zaytuna College, a Muslim liberal arts college);
Dr. Jacqueline Rivers (Director of Seymour Institute for Black Church and Policy Studies); Rabbi Dr.
Meir Soloveichik (Congregation Shearith Israel); and Katrina Lantos Swett (U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom). Professor Christopher Tollefson’s books include, for example, JOHN
PAUL II’S CONTRIBUTION TO CATHOLIC BIOETHICS (Springer 2004).
17 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE COMM’N ON UNALIENABLE RTS. (2020),
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Draft-Report-of-the-Commission-onUnalienable-Rights.pdf. The July 16 version of the Report was nowhere marked as a “draft.” In
formally presenting it to Secretary Pompeo, Chairperson Glendon referred to it four times as “our
Report,” never mentioning the word “draft.” See infra note 18.
18 Michael Pompeo, U.S. Sec’y of State, Speech on Unalienable Rights and the Securing of Freedom
(July 16, 2020), https://www.state.gov/unalienable-rights-and-the-securing-of-freedom/. The views of
the Report on these rights are discussed in part VII below.
19 Id.
20 Letter, supra note 11.
21 Id. The criticisms are discussed in Part VII below.
22 Commission U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Commission Note on Releasing its Final Report,
https://www.state.gov/report-of-the-commission-on-unalienable-rights.
23 See Part VI below.
24 Report, supra note 3, at 54.
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However—true to the Commission’s constricted mandate—this
recommendation explicitly refers only to human rights in the 1948 UDHR.25 The
entire Report refers only in passing to the two main UN human rights treaties—
even though the U.S. is a party to one and has signed the other.26 The Report
does not even mention seven other core UN human rights treaties, except to note
that the U.S. is a party to two of them.27 Downplaying the post-1948 treaties as
mere “positive law,”28 the Report asserts—incorrectly, in my view—that
positive international human rights law cannot be an “authoritative and final
arbiter of legal disputes.”29
The Report does recognize, but only in very general terms, that post-1948
international human rights treaties have “achieved tangible results.”30 They can
reflect a “broadening consensus” among nations about human rights.31 Their
creation of “hard legal requirements, often monitored and promoted by
supervisory institutions, enhances the protection of human rights.”32
Yet the Report quickly adds that states and scholars question whether the
“multiplication of human rights in treaties is an unalloyed good.”33 Even leading
human rights advocates question whether the multiplication of treaties is an
“unalloyed” good.34 But if, as the Commission recognizes, the treaties have been
“goods” and have achieved “tangible results,” what is the good, what are the
results, and why not discuss the provisions of the treaties? The Report does not
elaborate on these questions.
D. FUTURE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
Beyond the few core treaties already ratified by the U.S., what part of
contemporary international human rights law should help guide U.S. foreign
policy? For example, and especially given our particular history of mistreating
Native Americans,35 should our foreign policy respect the rights of Indigenous
Peoples recognized in a 2007 U.N. Declaration,36 but not in the U.S. Declaration

25 Id.
26 Id. at 34, 46–47.
27 Id. at 47.
28 Id. at 40–41.
29 Id. at 40. See infra notes 84 and 85.
30 Id. at 40.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 See, e.g., Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control, 78 AM. J.
INT’L LAW 607 (1984).
35 See, e.g., the history recited in McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020); See also Report, supra
note 3, at 43: “In the 19th century, under the flag of Manifest Destiny, the United States cruelly
expelled Native Americans from their ancestral lands with tremendous cost in human life and
compelled them to enter into treaties that it failed to honor.”
36 G.A. Res. 61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007). Although the U.S. did not vote for it initially, President Obama
declared U.S. support for it in 2016. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ANNOUNCEMENT OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR
THE U.N. DECLARATION ON THE RTS. OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE (2016), https://20092017.state.gov/documents/organization/184099.pdf. The Commission Report mentions neither the
Declaration nor the U.S. support.
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of 1776, the U.S. Constitution of 1789,37 or the UDHR of 1948? Or should our
diplomats ignore indigenous rights because they are recognized in a Declaration
rather than a binding treaty?
Apparently, the Commission—not without reason—viewed such questions
as beyond its mandate. But future U.S. foreign policymakers should not be so
limited. The time when international human rights law was circumscribed by the
principles of the 1948 UDHR is long past. Yet the only specific reference in the
Commission’s proposed criteria for recognizing new claims of rights is to the
1948 UDHR. There is no express mention of any of the widely supported treaties
and declarations reflecting the broad consensus on human rights in subsequent
decades.38
In responding to the Secretary’s constricted questions, the Commission’s
Report thus addresses only a portion of the human rights norms that should guide
our foreign policy. That is what Secretary Pompeo asked for and what the
Commission delivered. Neither the American people nor U.S. diplomats should
follow so narrow an approach.
II. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS
Until 1945, with few exceptions,39 human rights were deemed to be the
exclusive province of domestic laws and constitutions. At the conclusion of
World War II in 1945, the horrors of the Holocaust, the brutality of fascism,
mounting protests against colonialism, racial segregation in the U.S., and other
affronts against human rights led citizen groups and some states to lobby for,
and states generally to accept, a radical change: human rights were now to be a
concern of international law and institutions.40 The Charter of the United Nations
lists as one of its purposes to “achieve international co-operation . . . in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”41All
U.N. members pledge to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the
U.N. to achieve these purposes.42
Thus began modern international human rights law. In 1948, the U.N.
adopted the UDHR,43 which includes a broad spectrum of civil and political as

37 See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2,462, citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 553, 566–68 (1903), (“To
determine whether a tribe continues to hold a reservation, there is only one place we may look: The
Acts of Congress. This Court long ago held that the Legislature wields significant constitutional
authority when it comes to tribal relations, possessing even the authority to breach its own promises
and treaties.”).
38 Report, supra note 3, at 39–40.
39 See generally Paul Gordon Lauren, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: VISIONS
SEEN (Univ. Pennsylvania Press 2011).
40 Id. at 165-94. The Commission apparently places the dividing line at 1948: “But after the Universal
Declaration, no state may reasonably claim that the treatment of its own citizens in matters of human
rights is solely a question of its own domestic affairs.” Report at 30.
41 U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 3.
42 Id. arts. 55–56.
43 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
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well as economic, social, and cultural rights.44 Also in 1948, the U.N. adopted
its first major human rights treaty: The Convention against Genocide.45
Progress thereafter slowed during the height of the Cold War. However, as
decolonization spread, the increasing numbers of newly independent states in
the U.N. General Assembly pressed for, and in 1965 secured, the first of what
are now nine core U.N. human rights treaties: the Convention against Racial
Discrimination.46 Each core treaty defines a set of rights, which are monitored
by committees of experts who adopt general guides to interpretation, receive and
evaluate periodic reports from states, hold public hearings with public comment
on the reports, and render opinions on complaints against those states which
accept individual complaint procedures.47
In chronological order, the topics of the nine core treaties, with their year of
adoption and current number of states parties,48 are as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Racial Discrimination:49 1966, 182 states parties;
Civil and Political Rights:50 1966, 173 states parties;
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:51 1966, 171 states
parties;
Discrimination against Women:52 1979, 189 states
parties;
Torture:53 1984, 171 states parties;
Children:54 1990, 196 states parties;
Migrant Workers:55 1990, 55 states parties;
Persons with Disabilities (“CRPD”):56 2006, 182 states
parties; and
Enforced Disappearances (“CPED”):57 2006, 63 states
parties.

44 See Report supra note 3, at 29–30. For broader analysis, see Glendon, supra note 12.
45 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277. 152 states parties are parties to Convention as of August 30, 2020.
46 United Nations International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
47 See generally U.N. Office of the High Comm’r of Human Rights, Monitoring the Core International
Human Rights Treaties, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/Overview.aspx (showing dates
of adoption and the numbers of state parties as of December 8, 2020).
48 See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General:
Chapter IV: Human Rights, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&clang=_en.
49 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 46.
50 United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
51 United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3.
52 United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. [hereinafter CEDAW]
53 United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
54 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
55 United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3.
56 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S.
3.
57 United Nations International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearances, Dec. 20, 2006, 2716 U.N.T.S. 3.
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As shown by the numbers of states parties, seven of the core treaties have
been joined by 170 or more states, and four by more than 180 states (compared
to the total U.N. membership of 193 states).58 Plainly these seven treaties
represent a broad international consensus on legally binding human rights
which, in many respects, are broader or more specific than provided by the 1948
Declaration.59 They thus satisfy one of the Commission’s proposed criteria for
recognizing “new rights,” because they “represent a clear consensus across a
broad plurality of different traditions and cultures in the human family, as the
Universal Declaration did, and not merely a narrower partisan or ideological
interest.”60
If one looks to “like-minded democracies”—another Commission criterion
for recognizing new rights61—the consensus on these seven treaties is even more
overwhelming. All seven have been joined by (among many other states)
European democracies like Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.62 Democracies elsewhere like Australia,
Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Ghana, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa, South
Korea (Republic of Korea), and Uruguay have likewise joined all seven
treaties.63
Some states make reservations to some treaties.64 But that is an argument
for the U.S. to consider reservations to particular treaties—not to ignore them in
our foreign policy.
Two core treaties, on migrant workers and enforced disappearances, are not
widely ratified. The migrant workers treaty has been joined mainly by
predominantly migrant exporting countries, and not by predominantly receiving
countries like the U.S. On the other hand, and despite committing our own
disappearances in counterterrorism activities,65 U.S. foreign policy has long
viewed enforced disappearances as a key human rights issue.66
In addition to treaties, the U.N. has adopted numerous, non-binding
instruments on human rights. Many are widely supported, including by U.S.
Administrations. In addition to the 1948 UDHR, they include, for example, the

58

See
United
Nations,
Growth
in
U.N.
Membership:
1945-Present,
https://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nations-membership-1945present/index.html.
59 See Part IV below.
60 Report, supra note 3, at 40.
61 Id. at 39. One Commission criterion is: “Have the United States and other like-minded democracies
formally given their sovereign consent to the development in question through the established political
mechanisms for creating international law (in particular through the adoption of clear and explicit
treaty provisions)?”
62 See U.N. Secretary General, supra note 48.
63 Id.
64
Id.
Reservations
are
shown
at
the
United
Nations
Treaty
Collection,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&clang=_en.
65 See e.g., The United States’ “Disappeared”: The CIA’s Long-Term Ghost Detainees, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH at 1 (2004).
66 U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights have long included a section on
disappearances. See Dept. of State, 2019 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, app. A:
Notes on Preparation of the Country Reports and Explanatory Materials (2020).
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1946 resolution on the Nuremberg Principles,67 the 1998 declaration on human
rights defenders,68 the 2005 resolution on remedies for victims of human rights
violations,69 the 2007 declaration on the rights of Indigenous Peoples,70 the 2010
resolution on the right to clean water and sanitation,71 the 2011 Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights,72 and the 2015 Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules).73
While there are of course other, controversial U.N. resolutions, such widely
supported instruments as the foregoing should inform U.S. foreign policy on
human rights. Indeed, as the Commission recognizes, “some of the most
significant human rights landmarks and achievements have had a primarily
extra-legal and diplomatic-political character, such as the Helsinki Accords and
the Inter-American Democratic Charter.”74
In addition to U.N. instruments, there are also human rights treaties and
declarations (like the Helsinki Accords and the Inter-American Democratic
Charter) adopted by regional and sub-regional organizations, as in Europe,75 the
Americas,76 Africa,77 Arab nations,78 and Southeast Asia.79 Most do not apply
to the U.S. and a few of their provisions are inconsistent with universal norms,80
but most of their provisions can be considered by U.S. foreign policy toward
those countries which adopt them.
III. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES
Two kinds of bodies monitor and attempt to enforce international human
rights treaties and declarations: professional and political. The professional
bodies include the U.N. treaty committees for the core treaties mentioned above.

67 G.A. Res. 95(l), Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal, at 1 (Dec. 11, 1946).
68 See generally G.A. Res. 53/144, annex, Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals,
Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (Dec. 9, 1998).
69 See generally G.A. Res. 60/147, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of Int’l Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of Int’l
Humanitarian Law (Dec. 16, 2005).
70 G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007). Although
the U.S. did not vote for it initially, President Obama declared U.S. support for it in 2016. G.A. Res.
(2007) supra note 36.
71 G.A. Res. 64/292, The Human Right to Water and Sanitation (July 28, 2010).
72 Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, (Mar. 21, 2011).
73 G.A. Res. 70/175, The Nelson Mandela Rules (Dec. 17, 2015).
74 Report, supra note 3, at 41.
75 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 2889 U.N.T.S. 213, and subsequent protocols [hereinafter European Convention on Human
Rights]; 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1; Org. for Sec. and Cooperation in Europe, Human Dimension
Commitments, Vols. 1 and 2, https://www.osce.org/odihr/what-is-the-human-dimension.
76 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (May 2, 1948); American Convention on
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
77 African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217.
78 Arab Charter of Human Rights, September 15, 2004, League of Arab states [LAS].
79 Association ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, November 19, 2012, Ass’n of Se. Asian Nations
[ASEAN].
80 E.g., Mervat M. Rishmawi, The Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights: A Step Forward?, 5 HUMAN
RTS. L. REV. 361, 364 (2005).
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Their members are selected for expertise in human rights and are directed to vote
in their individual capacities.81 Other professional bodies are discussed below.
The political bodies vary, but at their center is the much-criticized—for
good reason—U.N. Human Rights Council. The Council’s forty-seven members
are not individuals but states whose representatives in the Council vote
according to the foreign policies of their governments.82
A. PROFESSIONAL BODIES
In addition to the nine U.N. treaty committees mentioned above, global and
regional human rights bodies include courts, commissions, and rapporteurs,
selected for their expertise in human rights, law, or related fields, and instructed
to apply international norms, rather than to follow instructions from their
governments. Because most are elected by governments, some professional
positions become occupied by individuals who lack ability, human rights
credentials, or independence.83 In my experience as a scholar and practitioner
over the last thirty years, however, a clear majority of the individuals elected are
both qualified and independent.
The Commission observes that “standards emanating from international
commissions and committees, individual experts, and advocacy groups—may
be useful sources of reflection about the appropriate scope of human rights, but
they lack the formal authority of law.”84
That may be true of many experts and committees. However, it overlooks
those who are judges on international human rights courts. Their judgments are
indeed a source of law, both under general international law,85 and, for states in
the cases before them, under the treaties that establish their courts.86
The U.N. has no court specifically for human rights. However, human rights
claims are sometimes presented by states, or human rights questions presented

81 For example, members of the Human Rights Committee, which is the monitoring committee for the
Civil and Political Covenant, “shall be persons of high moral character and recognized competence in
the field of human rights, consideration being given to the usefulness of the participation of some
persons having legal experience.” ICCPR supra note 50, at art. 28.2. They are to perform their
functions “impartially.” Id. at art. 38.
82 G.A. Res. 60/251, ¶ 7 (Mar. 15, 2006).
83 See, e.g., Douglass W. Cassel, Jr., D.Somoza’s Revenge: A New Judge for the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. L.J. 137, 137–38 (1992).
84 Report, supra note 3, at 40.
85 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(d) (ICJ to apply “judicial decisions . . . as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law”) and art. 59 (“The decision of the Court has no
binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”) – which of course
means that the judgment does have “binding force” between the parties in that case. In Medellin v.
Texas, 552 U.S. 491, (2008), the majority interpreted UN Charter art. 94, requiring that states
“undertake to comply” with ICJ judgments, not to obligate the U.S. to comply. I believe this view was
in error, for the reasons aptly stated by Justice Breyer for three justices in dissent.
86 E.g., European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 75, art. 46, art. 46.1 (“The High Contracting
Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.”);
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 76, art. 68.1 (“The states partiesstates parties to
the Convention undertake to comply with the judgment of the Court in any case to which they are
parties.”); June 10, 1998, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 10, 1998, Org. of African
Unity [OAU], art. 30 (“The states parties to the present Protocol undertake to comply with the
judgment in any case to which they are parties . . . .”). See note 85 supra.
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by U.N. organs, and resolved by the International Court of Justice.87 The
International Criminal Court (which is related to but not part of the U.N.)88 has
jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, which
often involve violations of human rights.89
In contrast, specialized human rights courts have been created by regional
organizations in Europe, the Americas, and Africa.90 From 1959 through 2019,
the European Court of Human Rights has rendered more than 22,000
judgments.91 Since 1987 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has
rendered over 400 judgments in contested cases,92 and twenty-five advisory
opinions.93 Since 2009, the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights has
made final decisions in 100 contested cases,94 and decided twelve requests for
advisory opinions.95
The result is a rich body of international human rights jurisprudence. As in
national legal systems, most judgments are not legally groundbreaking, but
many are controversial.96
Professionals are also selected as special rapporteurs or experts on human
rights themes or on human rights in troubled countries, and report annually to
the U.N. Human Rights Council.97 Hundreds of professionals are on the staff of

87 E.g., Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Judgment, 2012
I.C. J. 422 (July 20). The ICJ also renders advisory opinions, at the request of competent U.N. organs,
some of which address human rights. E.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136. (July 9).
88 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art.2, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
89 Id., arts. 5-8. Shamefully, the Trump Administration has authorized and imposed financial and visa
sanctions on ICC lawyers investigating cases involving the U.S. See Ellen Nakashima and Carol
Morello, Lawyers Urge Trump to Rescind Sanctions and Travel Bans for International Criminal Court,
WASH. POST (June 29, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/lawyers-urgetrump-to-rescind-sanctions-and-travel-bans-for-international-criminal-court/2020/06/29/0ef0c476ba15-11ea-86d5-3b9b3863273b_story.html.
90 Some sub-regional courts also address human rights matters in some cases. E.g., Koraou v. Niger,
Judgment No. ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/08/ Judgment (Oct. 27, 2008) (Niger held liable for slavery).
91 Overview 1959-2019, at 3, Eur. Ct. H.Rts (Feb. 2020).
92 Judgements, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., https://www.corteidh.or.cr/casos_sentencias.cfm?lang=en.
93
Advisory
Opinions,
Inter-Am.
Ct.
H.R.,
https://www.corteidh.or.cr/opiniones_consultivas.cfm?lang=en.
94 Contentious Matters, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Ct. H.P.R], https://en.africancourt.org/index.php/cases.
95 Advisory Opinions, Afr. Ct. H.P.R., https://en.african-court.org/index.php/cases/2016-10-17-16-1935.
96 See, e.g., Alvaro Paul, Decision-Making Process of the Inter-American Court: An Analysis Prompted
by the in Vitro Fertilization Case, 21 ILSA J. INT’L & COM. L. 87 (2014); O. Bowcott, Council of
Europe Accepts UK Compromise on Prisoner Voting Rights, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 7, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/dec/07/council-of-europe-accepts-uk-compromise-onprisoner-voting-rights.
97
There
are
currently
forty-two
thematic
mandates,
listed
at
https://spinternet.ohchr.org/ViewAllCountryMandates.aspx?Type=TM&lang=en, and nine country
mandates (for Belarus, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Iran, Mali, Myanmar, occupied
Palestinian
territories,
Somalia
and
Sudan),
listed
at
net.ohchr.org/ViewAllCountryMandates.aspx?lang=en.
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the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights.98 Others are members or staff
of regional human rights commissions.99
B. POLITICAL BODIES
The main political body is the U.N. Human Rights Council.100 Although
the election of its forty-seven member states is supposed to “take into account”
their human rights records,101 the reality is sometimes otherwise. Recent
members include, for example, Eritrea, the Philippines, and Venezuela,102 none
of whose recent records on human rights are admirable.103
It is fair to say that both the election of some members to the Council, and
some of its decisions,104 have at times given human rights a bad name. When the
U.S. withdrew in protest from the Council in 2018,105 U.S. Ambassador Nikki
Haley described the Council as a “hypocritical and self-serving organization that
makes a mockery of human rights.”106
However, no other nation followed the U.S. example. Then U.K. Foreign
Secretary Boris Johnson, for example, termed the U.S. decision “regrettable,”
arguing that while reforms are needed, the UNHRC is “crucial to holding states
to account.’”107 In a broad-based organization on the international plane, there
is probably no realistic way to avoid the political involvement of governments
of varying stripes, whether in human rights or in other fields. And, as noted
earlier, treaties negotiated by governments, and resolutions they adopt in
political bodies—both by the Council and by the U.N. General Assembly, and

98 The High Commissioner had some 1,300 staff as of December 2017, counting administrative staff as
well as human rights professionals. Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network
[MOPAN], OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’N FOR HUMAN RTS. (OHCHR): 2017-18 PERFORMANCE
ASSESSMENT, 13 (Apr. 2019).
99 The oldest and largest is the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, with seven elected
commissioners and, as of 2019, 134 staff, including administrative and contract staff. Annual Report
2019, Ch. VI,¶ A.1, INT’L.-AM. COMM’N. H.R. Other regional commissions have small staffs: for
example, the eleven-member African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the ten-member
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights.
100 Political bodies in regional organizations have varying records on human rights. See, e.g., Douglass
Cassel, Regional Human Rights Systems and State Pushback: The Case of the Inter-American Human
Rights System (2011–2013), 33 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, (2013).
101 G.A. Res. 60/251, ¶ 8 (Mar. 15, 2006).
102 Current Membership of the Human Rights Council for the 14th cycle, 1 January – 31 December
2020,
OFF.
OF
THE
U.N.
HIGH
COMM’N
FOR
HUMAN
RTS,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/CurrentMembers.aspx.
103 Freedom House most recently rates Eritrea as “not free,” the Philippines as “partly free,” and
Venezuela
as
“not
free.”
Countries
and
Territories,
FREEDOM
HOUSE,
https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores.
104 See, e.g., Lula Ahrens, UN Human Rights Council Faces the Same Criticism as its Predecessor,
GLOBAL POLICY FORUM (May 21, 2010), https://www.globalpolicy.org/un-reform/un-reformtopics/human-rights-council/49143-un-human-rights-council-faces-the-same-criticism-as-itspredecessor.html.
105 Report, supra note 3, at 49.
106 Colin Dwyer, U.S. Announces its Withdrawal from U.N. Human Rights Council, NPR (June 19, 2018,
5:09 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/19/621435225/u-s-announces-its-withdrawal-from-u-n-shuman-rights-council.
107 U.S. Quits ‘Biased’ UN Human Rights Council BBC NEWS (June 20, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/44537372.
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even at times by the Security Council108—have made important normative and
operational advances in human rights.
IV. U.S. PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
Of the seven core human rights treaties joined by all the democracies listed
in Part II above (and by the vast majority of states in the world), the U.S. has
joined only three: the Civil and Political Covenant, and the treaties against
torture and racial discrimination.109 That hardly means, however, that our
foreign policy should ignore the other widely ratified core treaties on the rights
of women, children, and persons with disabilities and on economic, social, and
cultural rights.
In addition to three core treaties, the U.S. has joined such other human rights
treaties as: the 1948 Genocide Convention110 (152 states parties), the 1953
Convention on the Political Rights of Women111 (123 states parties), the 1957
Convention on the Nationality of Married Women112 (75 states parties), the 1957
International Labor Organization (“ILO”) convention on forced labor113 (176
states parties114 ), the 1999 ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of Child
Labor115 (187 states parties116), the Optional Protocols of 2000 to the children’s
rights convention on child soldiers117 (170 states parties) and on the sale of
children, child prostitution and child pornography118 (176 states parties).119
The U.S. has also joined other treaties relating to human rights (although
categorized differently under international law), including the 1949 Geneva
Convention on protection of civilians in wartime120 (196 states parties121), the

108 E.g., U.N. Sec. Council Res. 2493, ¶ 5 (Oct. 29, 2019) (calling on member states “to promote all the
rights of women, including civil, political and economic rights”).
109 See ratification tables at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&clang=_en. See
also Report, supra note 3, at 47 and Part VII below.
110 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Dec. 9,1948, 78 U.N.T.S.
277.
111 United Nations Convention on the Political Rights of Women, Mar. 31, 1953, 193 U.N.T.S. 135.
112 United Nations Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, Feb. 20, 1957, 309 U.N.T.S. 65.
113 Int’l Labor Org., Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, June 25, 1957, No. 105.
114 Id.
115 Int’l Labor Org., Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, June 17, 1999, No. 182.
116 Ratifications of C182 – Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182), INT’L LABOR
ORG.,
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUM
ENT_ID:312327:NO.
117 United Nations, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement
of Children in Armed Conflict, May 25, 2000, 2173 U.N.T.S. 222.
118 United Nations, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, May 25, 2000, 2171 U.N.T.S. 227.
119
See
ratification
tables
at
the
United
Nations
Treaty
Collection,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&clang=_en (last visited Dec 1, 2020).
120 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of
War,
Aug.
12,
1949;
see
ratification
table
at
https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/states.xsp?xp_viewstates=XPages_NORMstatesParties&xp_treat
ySelected=380 (last visited Dec 1, 2020).
121
See
list
at
https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/states.xsp?xp_viewstates=XPages_NORMstatesParties&xp_treat
ySelected=380 (last visited Dec 1, 2020).
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1977 Geneva Protocol I on protection of victims of armed conflict122 (174 states
parties123), and the 1967 protocol on refugees124 (147 states parties).
V. THE NEED FOR OUR FOREIGN POLICY TO CONSIDER INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW BEYOND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE UDHR
At a general level, U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, the UDHR, and post1948 international human rights law embody common, underlying values. These
include especially life,125 liberty,126 equality,127 dignity,128

122 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), June 8, 1977,
https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=D9E6B6264D7723C3C12563CD002D6
CE4&action=openDocument (last visited Dec 1, 2020).
123 Id.
124 United Nations, Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
125 E.g., U.S. Const. amend. V (no deprivation of life without due process of law); UDHR supra note 6,
at art. 3, Dec. 10, 1948 (“right to life”); ICCPR supra note 50 art. 6.1, Dec. 19, 1966 (“inherent right
to life”).
126 E.g., U.S. Const. amend. V (no deprivation of liberty without due process of law); UDHR, supra note
6, at art. 3 (“right to . . . liberty”); ICCPR, supra note 50, at art. 9.1 (“right to liberty”).
127 E.g., U.S. Const. amend. XIV (“Equal protection of the laws”); UDHR, supra note 6, at art. 1 (“All
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”), art. 2 (UDHR rights “without distinction
of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.”), art. 7 (equality before the law and equal protection of the law.),
art. 16 (men and women “entitled to equal rights as to marriage . . . ”); ICCPR, supra note 50, at
Preamble (“inherent dignity of the human person”), art. 2.1 (states to ensure rights “without distinction
of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.”), art. 3 (“equal right of men and women” to civil and political
rights), art. 14.1 (equality before courts and tribunals), art. 24.1 (child’s right to protection “without
any discrimination”), art. 26 (equality before the law and equal protection of the law. No discrimination
on any ground “such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.”).
128 E.g., U.S. Const. amend. VIII (prohibiting “cruel and unusual punishments”); UDHR, supra note 6,
at art. 1 (“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”), art. 5 (no “torture or . . .
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”); ICCPR, supra note 50, at art. 7 (no “torture
or . . . cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment . . . . [N]o one shall be subjected without
his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.”), art. 10.1 (“All persons deprived of their
liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.”).
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community,129 autonomy,130 and security.131
But if the underlying values are the same, should not the U.S. Constitution
and UDHR suffice (as the Commission Report implies) to guide U.S. foreign
policy on human rights?
Despite its limited mandate, the Commission does not argue for simply
ignoring post-1948 international human rights law. Its Report acknowledges
that “[m]uch has been done in the decades since the approval of the UDHR to
go beyond these aspirational and pedagogical goals by translating its principles
into legally binding obligations, principally through treaties.”132 Indeed, “[t]he
collective effort since 1948 to translate the UDHR’s broad principles of human
rights into binding legal commitments through a network of treaties has achieved
laudable results.”133
Nonetheless, the Commission downplays post-1948 international human
rights law. First, its Report barely mentions this body of law. Second, the Report
implies that these laws depend, for effectiveness, on the moral and political
commitments of the UDHR134—as if embodying norms in law somehow
weakens, rather than strengthens, their moral force.135 And third, the Report
downgrades treaty law as mere “positive law,” which does not “create” human
rights136—overlooking the fact that the UDHR likewise did not “create,” but
merely recognized human rights.
There are at least five reasons why the U.S. Constitution and UDHR are not,
by themselves, sufficient, and why post-UDHR international human rights law
should not be virtually ignored, or downgraded as mere positive law.137 They
are (1) universality, (2) specificity, (3) newly protected groups, (4) newly
proscribed wrongs, and (5) newly identified actors.

129 The U.S. Constitution does not directly authorize the judiciary to impose communitarian values.
However, courts defer to legislative takings of private property for a “public purpose,” including the
welfare of the community as a whole, e.g., Hawaii Housing Auth. V. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)
(Hawaii Land Reform Act designed to “attack certain perceived evils of concentrated property
ownership” had “legitimate public purpose.”); International norms are more explicit, e.g., UDHR,
supra note 6, at art. 1 (All human beings “should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”),
art. 22 (“right to social security”), art. 29 (“duties to the community”); ICCPR, supra note 50, at art.
23.1 (“The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by
society and the State.”).
130 E.g., U.S. Const. amend. I (freedom of speech and religion), amend. 4 (“right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures”), Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (privacy); UDHR, supra note 6, at
art. 12 (no “arbitrary interference with . . . privacy, family, home or correspondence…”), art. 18
(“freedom of thought, conscience and religion”), art. 19 (“freedom of opinion and expression”);
ICCPR, supra note 50, at arts. 17.1 (no “arbitrary or unlawful interference with . . . privacy, family,
home or correspondence”), 18.1 (“freedom of thought, conscience and religion”), art. 19.1 (“right to
hold opinions without interference”), 19.2 (“freedom of expression”).
131 E.g., U.S. Const. amend. II (well-regulated militia “necessary to the security of a free state”); UDHR,
supra note 6, at art. 3 (“security of person”), art. 5 (no “torture or . . . cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.”), art. 9 (no “arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.”), art. 25 (“right to a standard
of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family”); ICCPR, supra note 50,
at art. 7 (no “torture or . . . cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”), art. 9.1 (“right to .
. . security of person”).
132 Report, supra note 3, at 31–32.
133 Id. at 58.
134 Id. at 32.
135 See, e.g., LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (Yale Univ. Press. rev. ed. 1969).
136 Report, supra note 3, at 41.
137 Id. at 40–41.
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A. UNIVERSALITY
As the Commission recognizes, universal human rights cannot be
photocopied in every aspect everywhere; within limits, they do and must allow
for variations in the extent and manner of their recognition and implementation,
in the context of diverse “political, economic, cultural, religious, and legal
traditions.”138 The U.S. Constitution cannot be the template for human rights
everywhere.
Consider, for example, one of the rights which Secretary Pompeo regards as
“foremost”: freedom of religion.139 The U.S. Constitution,140 the UDHR,141 and
post-1948 international human rights law,142 all provide for the free exercise of
religion and prohibit discrimination based on religion. But the U.S.
Constitution’s First Amendment, reflecting our particular history as a haven for
religious dissidents, goes a step further: it prohibits Congress from making any
law respecting an “establishment of religion. . . .”143
In contrast, many other nations, including democracies, have established
religions in one form or another. Yet few Americans would suggest that we
should denounce violations of human rights in England because the official
religion is the Church of England,144 or in Germany because it privileges
Christian faiths,145 or in Greece because the Orthodox Church is the State
religion.146 In these and other countries, it is enough that the State does not limit
the free exercise of religion, and does not otherwise discriminate against those
who believe in a particular faith or in no faith at all.
Another example is the right to fair trial. In the U.S., as in many common
law countries, the right to trial by jury is deemed fundamental to a fair trial in
significant cases.147 Most nations of the world, however, do not use juries.148
The UDHR accordingly does not refer to juries, and international human rights
law does not require trial by jury. As with the ban on established religion, our
constitutional right to jury does not guide other countries.

138 Id. at 32.
139 Pompeo, supra note 18.
140 U.S. Const. amend. I, XIV.
141 UDHR, supra note 6, at arts. 2 and 18.
142 E.g., ICCPR supra note 50, at arts. 2.1 and 18.
143 U.S. Const. amend. I.
144 E.g, Bérengère Massignon, Confrontations Europe: The Countries of Europe: All Secular, All
Different!, Jan. 25, 2015, http://confrontations.org/admin/the-countries-of-europe-all-secular-alldifferent/.
145 Id.
146 Id. See Constitution of Greece (2008), §2, art. 3.1.
147 U.S. Const. amends. VI (criminal cases) and VII (civil cases). As the Commission notes, James
Madison in 1789 conceded that trial by jury was not a “natural right,” but he nonetheless thought it
“essential.” Report, supra note 3, at 18. Most legal cultures of the world, then and now, do not agree
that it is essential.
148 However, many countries utilize other forms of lay participation in judicial decision-making. See
generally Valerie P. Hans, Jury Systems Around the World, CORNELL L. FACULTY PUBL’NS, 305
(2008) http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/305.
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B. SPECIFICITY
Although “universal” by definition, the UDHR is also quite general. Widely
supported human rights treaties and declarations are not only less culturally
specific than the U.S. Constitution, they are also not as generally worded as the
UDHR. They are both universal (or nearly so) and relatively specific in defining
rights.
Consider, again, the right to fair trial. The UDHR provides for a “fair and
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal. . . .”149 and for “the
right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public
trial at which [the accused] has had all the guarantees necessary for his
defence.”150
But what are those “guarantees” necessary for defense?151 The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted in 1966 and now joined by 173
states (including the U.S.), supplies a more specific answer. In criminal cases,
they include the “following minimum guarantees”152:
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he
understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him;
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his
defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing;
(c) To be tried without undue delay;
(d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or
through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does
not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance
assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require,
and without payment by him in any such case if he does not have
sufficient means to pay for it;
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under
the same conditions as witnesses against him;
(f) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand
or speak the language used in court;
(g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.”
Even in civil cases, what is a “public” trial? The U.S. Constitution does not
define “public,” U.S. Supreme Court interpretations do not govern other nations,
and the UDHR likewise does not define a “public” trial. In contrast, the Civil
and Political Covenant clarifies:
The press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a
trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or
national security in a democratic society, or when the interest
149 UDHR, supra note 6, at art. 10.
150 UDHR, supra note 6, at art. 11(1).
151 As the Commission notes, the “’right to a fair and public hearing before an independent and impartial
tribunal’ leaves undefined the details of what specifically constitutes independence, impartiality, and
even a tribunal.” Report, supra note 3, at 32.
152 ICCPR, supra note 50, at art. 14.3.
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of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent
strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special
circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of
justice; but any judgement rendered in a criminal case or in a
suit at law shall be made public except where the interest of
juvenile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern
matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children.153
Thus, if U.S. foreign policy on human rights were to be guided only or
primarily by our nation’s founding documents and the UDHR, with little or no
reliance on post-1948 international human rights law, U.S. diplomats would be
hampered, both in assessing whether other nations conduct fair trials and in
persuading the world at large to credit our assessments. U.S. Constitutional
provisions on fair trial are too country-specific, while the UDHR is too general.
To be grounded in criteria that are both universal and specific, our foreign policy
needs to embrace international human rights law and policy, embodied in widely
supported treaties and declarations,154 except where contrary to our values.
C. NEWLY PROTECTED GROUPS
Groups whose rights were not expressly recognized in 1948, or were hardly
recognized, are now widely accepted as needing specific recognition in order to
ensure their human rights. For example, the UDHR does not mention persons
with disabilities, who are now protected by a treaty joined by 182 states,155 or
Indigenous Peoples, whose rights are now recognized by a declaration that
enjoys broad support.156
The UDHR barely mentioned children. They were merely “entitled to
special care and assistance,” and implicitly entitled to free primary education.157
Yet their rights are now specified extensively by the Convention on the Rights
of the Child—a treaty joined by every U.N. member State (except the U.S.).158
D. NEWLY PROSCRIBED WRONGS
Even previously protected groups—such as women—are now protected
from additional wrongs. For example, the UDHR expressly recognized the right
of women to equal rights,159 but did not expressly protect them from sexual
violence and sexual harassment. In contrast, the 1981 Convention against

153 ICCPR, supra note 50, at art. 14.1.
154 E.g., G.A. Res. 40/146, Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (Dec. 13, 1985).
155 U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 45; U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 54.
156 G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007). The
Resolution was adopted by a vote of 144 to 4 (with 11 abstentions). Since then, all four opposing
states have reversed their positions and now support the Declaration. See G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N.
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007). Although the U.S. initially voted
against, President Obama declared U.S. support for the Declaration in 2016. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
supra note 36.
157 UDHR, supra note 6, at arts. 25(2) and 26(1).
158 U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 48; CEDAW supra note 52.
159 UDHR, supra note 6, at arts. 2 and 16.
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Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),160 now joined by 189 states, has
been consistently interpreted by the expert CEDAW committee to prohibit
violence against women.161 Regional treaties expressly prohibiting violence
against women have been joined by every OAS nation in Latin America and the
Caribbean,162 and by 42 states in Africa.163
E. NEWLY IDENTIFIED ACTORS
International human rights law and policy now protect against non-State
actors who were not addressed by the 1948 UDHR.164 For example, in 2011 the
U.N. Human Rights Council adopted, without dissent, the U.N. Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights, which impose on business a
“responsibility to respect” human rights.165 While not legally binding on
business, those principles have been widely embraced by states, international
organizations, industry associations, individual companies, and by some human
rights organizations.166 Nowadays the potential impacts of business on human
rights—both positive and negative167—are too important for U.S. foreign policy
to ignore, simply because they were not recognized by our nation’s founding
documents or by the UDHR. Yet the Commission’s Report mentions only
“violations” by non-State actors,168 without mentioning the post-1948 norms
that address them.

160 U.N. Secretary-General, supra notes 48; CEDAW, supra note 52.
161 U.N. Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 8th
Sess., CEDAW General Recommendation No. 12: Violence Against Women, 1989; U.N. CEDAW,
11th Sess., CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19: Violence Against Women, 1992; U.N.
CEDAW, 67th Sess., General Recommendation No. 35, 2017.
162 Organization of American states, Inter-American Convention, on the Prevention, Punishment and
Eradication of Violence against Women, Aug. 9, 1994, OAS treaty A-61 (joined by 32 states). See
ratification table at General Information of the Treaty: A-61, DEP’T OF INT’L LAW,
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-61.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2020)). Cuba, which refuses
to participate in the OAS, is the only independent Latin American or Caribbean State not party to this
OAS treaty. See General Information of the Treaty: A-61, DEP’T OF INT’L LAW,
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-61.html. (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
163 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa,
art. IV.2 (a)–(f), July 11, 2003 (See list of states partiesstates parties at List of Countries which have
Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of
Women
in
Africa,
AFRICAN
UNION,
https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37077-slPROTOCOL%20TO%20THE%20AFRICAN%20CHARTER%20ON%20HUMAN%20AND%20P
EOPLE%27S%20RIGHTS%20ON%20THE%20RIGHTS%20OF%20WOMEN%20IN%20AFRIC
A.pdf). (last visited Dec. 1, 2020)).
164 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948)
(calling on “every individual and every organ of society” to strive by “teaching and education” to
promote and secure human rights).
165 G.A. Res. 17/4, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (June
16, 2011) (endorsing the Guiding Principles, annexed to the Report of the Special Representative of
the Secretary-General, at 13-16, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011)).
166
See,
e.g.,
World
Business
Council
for
Sustainable
Development,
https://www.wbcsd.org/Programs/People/Social-Impact/Human-Rights (last visited Dec. 1, 2020)
(advocating that companies embed the Guiding Principles into their operations).
167 John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General), Protect, Respect and Remedy: a
Framework for Business and Human Rights, ¶¶ 2-3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5, (Apr. 7, 2008).
168 Report, supra note 3, at 52.
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F. LIMITS
Not every right in international human rights law is consistent with
American law and values. For example, Article 20 of the Civil and Political
Covenant requires state parties to prohibit “propaganda for war” and “[a]ny
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence.”169
In contrast, U.S. constitutional jurisprudence reflects the higher value we
place on free speech. Our First Amendment safeguards hate speech unless it is
“[1] directed to inciting or producing [2] imminent lawless action and is [3]
likely to incite or produce such action.”170 Accordingly, when the U.S. joined
the ICCPR in 1992, we made a reservation to Article 20, to preserve our broader
scope of free speech.171
Our foreign policy should not seek to impose our broader view of free
speech on others.172 However, neither should we accept the ICCPR’s narrower
conception, which is contrary to our fundamental values and law. On this issue
we should, in effect, respectfully agree to differ.
In general, however, U.S. constitutional jurisprudence is compatible with
international treaty law. Although the U.S. made other reservations to the ICCPR
(and to the race and torture conventions), none reflects an inconsistency with
basic American values.173
G. SUMMARY
In short, for at least five sets of reasons, in addition to the human rights
groups’ objections, grounding U.S. foreign policy on human rights only in our
nation’s founding documents and the 1948 UDHR risks undermining “decades
of human rights progress.”174 Except where international human rights law
conflicts with basic American values, as in the case of the limits on free speech,
our foreign policy should take account of widely supported international human
rights treaties and declarations.
VI. MERITS OF THE REPORT
The Commission’s Report is commendable for a number of important
points. It would be regrettable if they were to become lost amid the protest over
169 ICCPR, supra note 145, at art. 20, §2.
170 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
171 "(1) That article 20 does not authorize or require legislation or other action by the United States that
would restrict the right of free speech and association protected by the Constitution and laws of the
United States.” Reservations of the United States of America to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966),
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV4&chapter=4&clang=_en#EndDec (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
172 The Commission agrees. See Report, note 3 at 25, 36-37, 39.
173 When the U.S. ratified the ICCPR in 1992, it made a Reservation preserving the right to impose
capital punishment “for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age.” ICCPR, supra
note 145, at art. 6, §5. However, since then, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the Constitution
prohibits the juvenile death penalty. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
174 Letter, supra note 11.
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the Report’s politicized context, constrained mandate, and certain of its
conclusions. The Report’s positive aspects include at least the following:
• its condemnation of racial injustice in the U.S.,
• its appropriately modest assessment of the U.S. human rights
record,
• its holistic reading of the UDHR,
• its abstention from any claim that human rights demand
acceptance of conservative religious or political positions on
social issues,
• its bipartisan history of the U.S. stance on human rights,
• its prioritization of the role of human rights in government,
• its timely criticisms of Russia and China on human rights, and
• its call for human rights to be an important component of our
foreign policy.
The Report addresses these issues as follows:
A. RACE
The Report does not sugarcoat American violations of human rights.
Particularly in the area of racial injustice, the Report gives special recognition
to “the sin of slavery,” calling it “our nation’s deepest violation of unalienable
rights.”175 While rightly praising structural safeguards (e.g., limited powers,
separation of powers) in our Constitution of 1789, the Report laments that the
Founders’ basic charter “betrayed the promise of unalienable rights by giving
legal protection to slavery.”176
The Report traces this betrayal through U.S. history. Lauding federalism, it
nonetheless recalls that “under the banner of states’ rights, states exploited
federalism to shield slavery and prolong discrimination.”177 In the 1930s, “Even
the New Deal’s sweeping reform of labor law excluded agricultural and
domestic workers, a large proportion of whom were members of racial and
ethnic minorities.”178
In the present day, “[t]he brutal killing of an African-American man by a
police officer in the late spring of 2020 and the subsequent civic unrest that
swept the country underscore that much still must be accomplished.”179 The
Report stresses “the nation’s unfinished work in overcoming the evil effects of
its long history of racial injustice.”180
B. MODESTY

175 Report, supra note 3, at 9.
176 Id. at 18.
177 Id. at 15.
178 Id. at 22.
179 Id. at 24.
180 Id. at 4.
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Although the Report does not pretend to undertake a comprehensive
historical survey, it is also appropriately modest about the U.S. record in other
areas of human rights. “Americans rightly take pride in their constitutional
tradition.”181 However, we must “show the same honest self-examination and
efforts at improvement” that we expect of others.182 The U.S. is “burdened with
a history of grave departures from the principles of freedom and equality both at
home and abroad.”183
At home, “under the flag of Manifest Destiny, the United States cruelly
expelled Native Americans from their ancestral lands with tremendous cost in
human life and compelled them to enter into treaties that it failed to honor.”184
There has been “much in America with which to struggle,” including
“discrimination against immigrants and other vulnerable minorities; and the
imposition of legal liabilities on, and the withholding of opportunities from,
women.”185 Yet “[p]rogress toward the securing of rights for all has often been
excruciatingly slow and has been interrupted by periods of lamentable
backsliding.”186
Abroad, the U.S. “has sided at times with dictators and undermined
expressions of democratic will. And the United States has undertaken military
actions that, many have concluded, were ill-conceived and damaging to the
cause of freedom.”187 Given this record, “the nation must be humble in light of
the work that remains to be done.”188
Such assessments might be unremarkable coming from, say, Human Rights
Watch. But from a commission appointed by possibly the most jingoistic, least
internationalist Administration in modern U.S. history, the candor is noteworthy
and commendable.
C. UDHR
Reflecting the scholarship of Professor Glendon,189 the Report offers a
holistic view of the UDHR.190 The UDHR has both civil and political, as well as
economic, social and cultural rights.191 However, the UDHR “is not a mere list
of severable, free-standing provisions, each understood in isolation and on its
own terms.”192 It embodies a “holistic understanding of individual rights in
community.”193 It was “written and understood as an integrated set of
interlocking principles. Each principle was like an instrument that made an
essential contribution to the harmony of the whole ensemble.”194

181 Report, supra note 3, at 54–55.
182 Id. at 44.
183 Id. at 43.
184 Id. at 43.
185 Id. at 8–9.
186 Report, supra note 3, at 9.
187 Id. at 43.
188 Id. at 9.
189 See authorities cited in Glendon, supra note 12.
190 Report, supra note 3, at 29-33.
191 Id. at 30.
192 Id. at 31
193 Id.
194 Id.
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The Report does not take this understanding to what seems to me to be its
logical conclusion —that economic, social, and cultural rights are “interlocked”
with, and no less human rights, than are civil and political rights.195 Still, the
Commission’s holistic reading lays the foundation for what should be an
unsurprising conclusion: that all rights in the UDHR, including economic,
social, and cultural rights, are universal human rights.
D. SOCIAL ISSUES
When the Commission was announced, opponents expressed fears that its
“deeply conservative” patronage, mission, and Chair would “threaten sexual
equality, LGBTQ rights and reproductive health globally.”196
To the Commission’s credit, however, it resisted any temptation to equate
human rights with conservative religious or political positions on hot-button
social issues. Perhaps this was because, as they openly state, the Commissioners
were “not of one mind on many issues where there are conflicting interpretations
of human rights claims—abortion, affirmative action, and capital punishment,
to name a few.”197
Whatever the reason, their Report admits that no “single answer” to
metaphysical questions of “natural rights” (a term for “human rights” at the
time198) was “decisive in 1776. Still less today. . . .”199 The Report acknowledges
the reality that “[i]n divisive social and political controversies in the United
States—abortion, affirmative action, same-sex marriage—it is common for both
sides to couch their claims in terms of basic rights.”200 This is simply an
empirical fact, one on which all sides to these social controversies might
agree.201
E. BIPARTISAN HISTORY
Appointed by a Republican Administration, the Commission nonetheless
repeatedly cites Democrats in its summary history of U.S. commitments to
human rights. They include Woodrow Wilson,202 Eleanor Roosevelt,203 Franklin

195 See infra Part VII.C.
196 Katherine M. Marino, How Mike Pompeo’s New Commission on ‘Unalienable Rights’ Butchers
History, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/08/15/how-mike-pompeos-new-commissionunalienable-rights-butchers-history/.
197 Report at 7.
198 Id. at 12 (Unalienable rights were “sometimes referred to as natural rights in the founding era and
today commonly called human rights. . . .”)
199 Id. at 11.
200 Id. at 24.
201 See, for example, the conflicting arguments in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (rights of gay persons to be free from discrimination versus
freedom of speech and free exercise of religion by a baker who refused to bake a special cake for
same sex marriage). Although the baker won a 7-2 decision by the Court, the point here is simply
that claims of basic rights, as often occurs, were made on both sides.
202 Report, supra note 3, at 43.
203 Id. at 7-8, 58.
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Roosevelt,204 Harry Truman,205 and Jimmy Carter,206 among others,207 along
with Ronald Reagan.208
Despite this gesture, the historical record is not evenly bipartisan.
Diplomatically left unsaid is the reality that Democratic administrations and
Senates have generally been somewhat more open to international human rights
treaties than Republican ones.209 For example, would any recent Republican
president have advocated ratification of all five human rights treaties, and
acceptance of three international complaint procedures, presented by Jimmy
Carter to the Senate?210
Even so, the Report is not inaccurate in stating that a cautious approach has
been “the consistent orientation of the U.S. State Department to international
human rights law and institutions for at least the past half-century, under both
Democratic and Republican administrations.”211
F. GOVERNMENT PRIORITY
The Report is clear that human rights should be a top priority for all
governments: “The [U.S.] Declaration [of Independence] also holds it to be a
self-evident truth that the first task of political society is to ensure that
unalienable rights are respected: ‘to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men.’”212 Similarly, the UDHR “affirms that all nations’
political institutions and laws should be judged by their ability to secure the
rights that individuals everywhere share.”213
That includes our government: “The most important obligation of the United
States government under the Constitution is to protect its citizens’ unalienable
rights, which it accomplishes by giving expression to those rights in the positive
law of the land.”214
G. RUSSIA AND CHINA
Naming “flagrant human rights abusers—such as China, Cuba, Libya,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela,” the Report accurately observes that “a
large portion of the globe now lives in countries with scant human rights

204 Id. at 21, 43.
205 Id. at 22.
206 Id. at 43, 44, 46.
207 Id. at 44 (Senator Henry Jackson and Rep. Charles Vanik), 45 (Rep. Donald Fraser).
208 Id. at 44, 46.
209 See, e.g., infra Part VII.E.
210 See generally Jimmy Carter, U.S. President, Human Rights Treaties Message to the Senate, (Feb.
23, 1978), in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: JAMES E. CARTER, JR.
1978 at 395 (1979), (Race Convention; Civil and Political Covenant; Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights Covenant; American Convention on Human Rights; individual complaints under Race
Convention, and State-to-State complaints under the Civil and Political Covenant, and the American
Convention); Jimmy Carter, U.S. President, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Message to the Senate Transmitting the Convention, (Nov. 12,
1980), in 3 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: JAMES E. CARTER, JR. 198081 at 2715 (1982).
211 Report, supra note 3, at 41.
212 Id. at 11–12.
213 Id. at 12.
214 Id. at 36.
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protection. Among these countries, the most influential are Russia and
China.”215
In deploring the current attitudes and practices on human rights by the
governments of Russia and China, the Commission is in the good company of
major human rights groups otherwise critical of its Report, such as Amnesty
International216 and Human Rights Watch.217
Today’s world has no shortage of gross violators of human rights. The
Commission’s Report rightly singles out the most influential violators, Russia
and China, for extended discussion.218 If anything, the Commission understates
the threat to human rights posed by the rising economic, military, and diplomatic
power of China.219 Unless Beijing’s orientation changes dramatically, human
rights will likely be under mounting and greater threat in the coming decades
than at any time since 1948.

215 Id. at 49.
216 Russia: Amnesty’s most recent summary states, “Russia’s human rights record continued to
deteriorate, with the rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly consistently
restricted . . . . Those attempting to exercise these rights faced reprisals, ranging from harassment to
police ill-treatment, arbitrary arrest, heavy fines and in some cases criminal prosecution and
imprisonment. Human rights defenders and NGOs were targeted . . . . Hundreds of Jehovah’s
Witnesses were persecuted for their faith. Other vulnerable minorities also faced discrimination and
persecution. Counter-terrorism provisions were widely used to target dissent . . . . Torture remained
pervasive, as did impunity for its perpetrators. Violence against women remained widespread and
inadequately addressed . . . . Refugees were forcibly returned to destinations where they were at risk
of torture.” Amnesty INT’L, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA: REVIEW OF
2019 24 (2020) (Index: EUR 01/1355/2020).
China: Even before recent deteriorations, Amnesty’s most recent world report summarized human
rights in China as follows: “The government continued to draft and enact new laws under the guise
of ‘national security’ that presented serious threats to human rights. Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu
Xiaobo died in custody. Activists and human rights defenders were detained, prosecuted and
sentenced on the basis of vague and overbroad charges. . . . Police detained human rights defenders
outside formal detention facilities, sometimes incommunicado, for long periods, which posed
additional risk of torture and other ill-treatment . . . . Controls on the internet were strengthened.
Repression of religious activities outside state-sanctioned churches increased. Repression conducted
under “anti-separatism” or “counterterrorism” campaigns remained particularly severe in
the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and Tibetan-populated areas. Freedom of expression in
Hong Kong came under attack . . . .” AMNESTY INT’L, REPORT 2017/18: THE STATE OF THE
WORLD’S HUMAN RIGHTS 125 (2018) (Index: POL 10/6700/2018).
217 E.g., Yaqiu Wang, In China, the “Great Firewall” is Changing a Generation, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Sept. 1, 2020, 11:57 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/01/china-great-firewallchanging-generation (originally published in Politico); Rachel Denber, Russia Needs an
Investigation into Navalny’s Illness: Kremlin Critic is Fighting for his Life, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Aug. 21, 2020, 12:02 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/08/21/russia-needs-investigationnavalnys-illness.
218 Report, supra note 3, at 49–52.
219 According to the World Bank, China’s total real income, measured in PPP (purchasing power
parity) terms, surpassed that of the U.S. in 2017. Jeffrey Frankel, Is China Overtaking the US as a
Financial and Economic Power?, THE GUARDIAN (May 29, 2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/may/29/is-china-overtaking-the-us-as-a-financial-andeconomic-power. Entrepreneur Elon Musk predicts that China’s economy will double or triple that of
the U.S. Amanda Macias & Jessica Bursztynsky, Elon Musk says Chinese Economy Will Surpass US
by 2 or 3 Times: ‘The Foundation of War is Economics,’ CNBC (Feb. 28, 2020),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/28/musk-says-chinese-economy-will-surpass-the-us-by-two-orthree-times.html. For military power, see, e.g., John Grady, Pentagon Report: China Now Has
World’s Largest Navy as Beijing Expands Military Influence, USNI NEWS (Sept. 1, 2020),
https://news.usni.org/2020/09/01/pentagon-report-china-now-has-worlds-largest-navy-as-beijingexpands-military-influence. For diplomatic influence, see, e.g., Ben Westcott, China has overtaken
US as world’s largest diplomatic power, think tank says, CNN (Nov. 26, 2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/26/asia/us-china-diplomacy-lowy-intl-hnk/index.html.
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H. FOREIGN POLICY
The Report recognizes the threat, not only from Russia and China, but from
other authoritarian governments: “[W]ith hundreds of millions of men and
women around the world suffering extreme forms of deprivation under harsh
authoritarian regimes, we are of one mind on the urgent need for the United
States to vigorously champion human rights in its foreign policy.”220
This is no minor matter: “America must rise to today’s challenges with the
same energy and spirit that she brought to the building of a new international
order in the wake of two world wars.”221 In such an endeavor, the U.S. cannot
succeed unilaterally: “With freedom, human equality, and democracy facing
strong ideological opposition from powerful states, this is not the moment for
the liberal democracies of the world to falter in defending the principles that
have enabled them to achieve ‘better standards of life in larger freedom.’”222 Yet
“even some liberal democracies appear to be losing sight of the urgency of
human rights in a comprehensive foreign policy.”223
Although the Commission apparently shrinks from using the word
“multilateralism,” the resulting implications are clear, even if understated. The
Report “notes the likelihood that U.S. measures to promote human rights abroad
will be more effective when carried out in cooperation with other nations. No
nation alone can achieve all that is necessary to bring human rights to life, and
one nation acting by itself will always be suspected, fairly or unfairly, of ulterior
motives.”224
In spite of its clarion call, the Commission is not naïve about the potential
role of human rights in U.S. foreign policy. Its Report recognizes that the
implications of human rights for foreign affairs are “more diffuse and indirect
than they are for domestic affairs,”225 because of the “multiple factors that must
be considered in the formation of foreign policy.”226
Still, the “self-evident truths concerning individual freedom and human
equality on which the United States was founded nevertheless should inform and
elevate America’s conduct in the world.”227 The Commission might have added
that the global consensus reflected in widely supported international human
rights instruments should likewise inform and elevate U.S. foreign policy.
VII. CRITICISMS OF THE REPORT
As noted above, the Commission’s draft Report, later adopted as its final
Report with only minor changes, was roundly criticized on multiple grounds by
more than 200 organizational and individual human rights advocates in a letter

220 Report, supra note 3, at 7.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 6.
224 Id. at 54.
225 Report, supra note 3, at 25.
226 Id. at 53.
227 Id. at 25.
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to Chairperson Glendon.228 They object to Secretary Pompeo’s “political
agenda” underlying the Commission’s work, adding that “the failure of the
Secretary and the Commission to acknowledge the many Trump administration
policies that have significantly undermined America’s leadership on human
rights undercuts both the Commission’s standing and the report itself.”229
Even though the Commission might respond that its mandate was to focus
on “principle, not policy formulation,”230 the perception that it gives a free pass
to its patron is not easily dispelled. However, my present assessment attempts to
meet the Commission on its own ground, and to consider only its analysis of
human rights principles.231
At the level of principles, the letter from the human rights advocates
(hereafter “HR advocates”) identifies five “most concerning aspects” of the
Report. Recall that the HR advocates were given only a token two weeks to
respond to the Commission’s Report.232 With more time, some who signed
might have chosen differing words, nuances, or priorities.
The following are my attempts to paraphrase the concerns of the HR
advocates together with brief observations on each concern:233
A. PROLIFERATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CLAIMS:
HR Advocates: The proliferation of new claims does not undermine the
legitimacy and credibility of human rights. On the contrary, this “growing
understanding of rights should be celebrated as an accomplishment worth
protecting—one that fulfills the promise of human rights . . . .”234
Observations: The response of the HR advocates is generally on the mark.
New human rights treaties and declarations are not easily achieved; they
generally require an enormous amount of work over an extended period of time
in order to gain widespread acceptance. Wary of being held to account for
expanding obligations, many states do not lightly accept new claims of human
rights.
That does not necessarily mean that political claims never succeed in
winning broad acceptance as human rights. But if undeserving claims have been
broadly accepted as human rights, it seems to me that the Commission has the
burden of identifying at least what it considers to be leading examples and
explaining why they do not qualify. Its Report does neither.
B. MEANING AND SCOPE OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
HR Advocates: There is no “untenable uncertainty” about the meaning of
human rights. Human rights have been clarified by the UDHR and the nine core
UN treaties. “That the current administration might not agree with these

228 Glendon, supra note 12.
229 Id.
230 Report, supra note 3, at 7.
231 This by no means suggests that I approve of Trump Administration policies on human rights. I
oppose most of them, but those are issues for another day.
232 Supra Part I.C.
233 Glendon, supra note 12, at 2–4.
234 Id. at 2–3.
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instruments and their obligations in full or in part does not mean that there is
confusion about human rights.”235
Observations: Initial uncertainty about meaning and scope is inherent in
broad legal phrases, including human rights like “freedom of speech” and
“freedom of religion,” until interpreted. As illustrated in Part V above, phrases
such as “fair” and “public” trial in the UDHR have subsequently been specified
in greater detail by broadly supported human rights treaties and declarations.
There is far more definitional uncertainty in the UDHR than in subsequent
international human rights law. Focusing on the UDHR, and downplaying
subsequent international law, as Secretary Pompeo requested and as the
Commission’s Report does, makes any problem of uncertainty worse, not better.
Human rights are also interpreted by the jurisprudence of international
courts and experts, applying the norms in the instruments that create them. As
with U.S. Supreme Court decisions, there are inevitably disputes over particular
interpretations, often evidenced in dissenting opinions by judges. However, the
solution is not simply to retreat to the broad wording of the U.S. Constitution or
UDHR and eschew any interpretation at all. Again, simply ignoring international
human rights case law, as the Commission’s Report does, makes problems of
uncertainty worse, not better.
However, not all instruments denominated as human rights are broadly
accepted. Simply referring, as do the HR advocates, to the nine core UN human
rights treaties, is not dispositive. As noted in Part II above, two of those nine
treaties (on migrant workers and enforced disappearances) are not widely
ratified. There is a case to be made that they are nonetheless human rights.
However, making that case would require more extended analysis than presented
in the HR advocates’ necessarily swift and brief letter responding to the
Commission’s draft Report.
C. RIGHTS HIERARCHIES:
HR Advocates: Even though the Report acknowledges that rights are
“universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated,” it then “prioritizes
property rights and religious liberty over other civil and political rights, and
advocates for the de-prioritization of socioeconomic rights, including by putting
increased emphasis on rights interpreted from specific American documents,
rather than those guaranteed in international treaties that bind the United States
and other governments.”236
Observations: As often happens in reports drafted by committee, the Report
is both internally inconsistent and ambiguous on the hierarchy of rights. On the
one hand, the Report argues persuasively that “it defies the intent and structure
of the UDHR to pick and choose among its rights according to preferences and
ideological presuppositions while ignoring other fundamental rights.”237 The
Report cites with approval the statement in the 1993 Vienna Declaration that “all
human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.”238
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On the other hand, elsewhere in the Report, there are suggestions that
Secretary Pompeo’s “foremost” rights—property rights and religious
liberty239—have a higher status in the hierarchy of rights. Property rights are
“central to the effective exercise of positive rights and to the pursuit of happiness
in family, community, and worship.”240 Religious liberty enjoys “similar
primacy in the American political tradition.”241
But are these philosophical affirmations, or merely historical observations?
For example, the Report states, “Prominent among the unalienable rights that
government is established to secure, from the founders’ point of view, are
property rights and religious liberty. A political society that destroys the
possibility of either loses its legitimacy.”242 Is this the Commission’s view of
legitimacy, or merely a description of the “founders’ point of view”?
In light of the Commission’s mandate, one might argue that this ambiguity
does not matter. A Report commissioned to reaffirm “unalienable rights,” as
understood by America’s founders and in the UDHR, by definition embraces the
“founders’ point of view.” However, as noted in Part VI above, the Report
expressly condemns the founders’ embrace of slavery. So, the Commission and
the founders do not agree on everything. Do they agree on the centrality of
property rights and the primacy of religious liberty?
And, even if they do, does this mean that these rights have higher status than
other vitally important human rights, such as freedom of speech, racial equality,
and freedom from torture? Or is the Commission merely arguing that property
rights and religious liberty should not be viewed as any less important?
Less ambiguity attends the HR advocates’ further objection that the Report
de-prioritizes socioeconomic rights. Quoting article 22 of the UDHR, the Report
does cite the “social and economic rights indispensable for [a person’s] dignity
and the free development of his personality.”243 However, the Report also
equates these rights with mere “positive rights” left primarily to the
legislature,244 describes them as “aspirational principles,”245 and characterizes
them as “controversial because they frequently involve a clash of rights
claims.”246 They are “most compatible” with American founding principles
when they serve as “minimums” that enable citizens to “exercise their
unalienable rights, discharge their responsibilities, and engage in selfgovernment.”247 However, they are “least compatible” when they “induce
dependence on the state, and when, by expanding state power, they curtail
freedom”—including “the rights of property and religious liberty.”248
In U.S. foreign policy, the Report concludes, socioeconomic rights must be
“taken seriously,” but treated differently, “through programs of economic

239 Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Sec’y of State, Unalienable Rights and the Securing of Freedom (July 16,
2020), https://www.state.gov/unalienable-rights-and-the-securing-of-freedom/.
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assistance and development.”249 Such a foreign policy would retain only the
language, but no real commitment, to socioeconomic rights. When other
governments fail to provide basic education or health care to their citizens,250
especially while privileging the wealthy or incurring bloated military
expenditures, the U.S. should take note and speak up, no less than when
governments repress demonstrators. Foreign aid is not an adequate substitute.
As a percentage of our economy, U.S. foreign aid is minuscule and well below
that of other developed nations.251 Even if it were more generous, aid is any
event treated by Washington as a matter of grace, not right.
International human rights law is not blind to the fact that implementation
of socioeconomic rights depends on resources. Honduras (GDP per person of
$2,500),252 is not Switzerland (GDP per person over $80,000).253 Under the
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,254 joined by 171
countries,255 each state party undertakes, only “to the maximum of its available
resources,” to take steps to achieve “progressively the full realization” of
Covenant rights.256 Available resources include both a country’s own resources
and economic and technical assistance received through international
cooperation.257 Such a realistic commitment, and not a mere dependence on the
vagaries and selectivity of foreign aid budgets, is faithful to the integral
recognition of socioeconomic rights in the UDHR.
D. SOCIAL ISSUES:
HR Advocates: The “weight of both domestic and international human
rights law . . . clearly establishes and recognizes the protection of LGBTQI+
rights and sexual and reproductive rights, including abortion, as human rights
imperatives.”258 For the Report to suggest otherwise is to “substitute the
ideology of the Administration and opinion of 11 individuals”259 for these laws.
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Observations: The Commission Report does not deny the existence of these
social rights, observing only that claims of rights are made by both sides on these
contentious issues.260 Even if the “weight” of international human rights law
recognizes reproductive rights, including abortion in some circumstances, there
remain important exceptions.261 While equality based on gender identity and
sexual preference is rapidly gaining ground in international law, it is by no
means yet universally recognized in regard to all rights. For example, a
constitutional right to same sex marriage was recognized only in 2015 by the
U.S. Supreme Court.262 A human right to same sex marriage was recognized
only in 2017 by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,263 but was rejected
in 2016 by the European Court of Human Rights.264 In any event, both
domestically265 and internationally, these rights –important as they are–may
sometimes be limited by the rights of religious objectors “in a democratic
society.”266
E. NEW RIGHTS:
HR Advocates: The Report’s restrictive criteria for recognizing new rights
would “sideline the post-1948 treaties and processes by which human rights
have properly been interpreted to cover marginalized groups and circumstances
not explicitly addressed in the treaties in a manner consistent with their
principles.”267
Observations: As argued in Part V above, this objection is well-taken.
The Report argues that the development of new rights in positive law “must
be informed by thoughtfulness and due deliberation,” and that this “reflects the

260 Report, supra note 3, at 24.
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of abortion, including in cases where the woman’s life is at risk and when the pregnancy results from
a rape or incest, imposes a disproportionate burden …”); Matter of B, Provisional Measures with
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survival of the child were nil).
262 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
263 State Obligations Concerning Change of Name, Gender Identity, and Rights Derived from a
Relationship Between Same-Sex Couples (Interpretation and Scope of Articles 1(1), 3, 7, 11(2), 13,
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consistent orientation of the U.S. State Department to international human rights
law and institutions for at least the past half century.”268
No responsible person would argue for acceptance of new rights
thoughtlessly and without due deliberation. However, the U.S. record toward
international human rights law owes at least as much to a high constitutional
barrier and to domestic politics. Unlike many democracies,269 the U.S.
Constitution requires a two-thirds supermajority of the Senate to consent to
ratification of treaties.270 A minority of only thirty-four Senators can block
consent to a human rights treaty.
Combined with domestic political divisions, this barrier can become
insuperable. For example—after due deliberation—President Carter referred the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(adopted in 1979) to the Senate for ratification in November 1980. But the
Senate did not act on the treaty in Carter’s few remaining weeks in office. The
Convention was then opposed by the Administrations of Ronald Reagan and
George H.W. Bush.
In 1994 President Clinton sent a treaty package to the Senate for ratification
of the Convention, but it “never came to vote in the full Senate because of
opposition from several Senators.”271 In 2002 the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee voted twelve to seven to report the Convention favorably, but
Congress adjourned before the Senate could vote on the treaty. In 2007, the Bush
Administration informed the Senate that it did not support action on the
Convention at that time.
In 2009, the Obama Administration informed the Senate that it supported
action on the Convention “at this time,” and in 2010 reiterated its support for the
treaty.272 However, by 2014, despite the support of the Administration and the
Chair of the Senate Committee, supporters still had not managed to win the
support of the sixty-seven Senators.273 Today the U.S. remains one of only a
handful of U.N. member states not to have joined the Convention.
VIII. CONCLUSION
There are legitimate criticisms, as well as points to admire, both in the
Report’s idiosyncratic conception of human rights and in the U.S. record on
international human rights. However, there can be little dispute that authoritarian
regimes are now on the march around the world, and that the government of the
rising superpower in China rejects many of the basic concepts of freedom,
democracy, and human rights that have animated international human rights law
since 1945.
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The Commission is then right to recommend that, “in this moment of crisis
for the human rights idea, America must pursue that cause with renewed vigor,
with pride in what has been accomplished, with humility born of the awareness
of her own ‘shortcomings and imperfections’ and of the complexities of world
politics . . . .”274

274 Report, supra note 3, at 45.

